Abstract: Despite its centrality in political philosophy, I argue for eliminating the concept of ‘feasibility’. Surveying standard philosophical accounts, I show that ‘feasibility’ ambiguously refers to possibility or probability, with more or less additional parameters. Because of this ambiguity, and because feasibility claims routinely omit key specifications – such as relevant agents, constraint types, or probability thresholds – I argue that feasibility claims further compound pre-existing ambiguities in possibility and probability talk. I introduce a Disambiguation Protocol (DP) for analyzing and replacing feasibility claims, and argue the DP’s effectiveness bolsters the case for eliminativism. Weighing conservation against elimination, I contend that conservationist payoffs are weak, whereas eliminativist reasons – especially ‘feasibility’s potential ideological function – are strong. Eliminating ‘feasibility’ would clarify political philosophy and, potentially, wider political discourse, while ensuring transformative political proposals are not excluded from consideration by appeal to a defective concept.